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Propositions relating to the dissertation The Role of Collective Redress Actions to Achieve Full 
Compensation for Violations of European Union Competition Law by Žygimantas Juška 
 
1. Achieving full compensation for EU competition law violations is very difficult, if not 
impossible at times, due to the complex and wide-ranging nature of antitrust infringements. 
The main indicator for the achievement of full compensation is how effectively vulnerable 
victims (who suffered low value harm or who were indirectly affected by the violation) can 
exercise their right to claim and obtain compensation.   
 
2. One of the main aims of the European Commission’s approach on collective redress is to 
provide robust safeguards against abusive litigation. However, this approach fails to 
contribute to the achievement of full compensation; only a more forceful approach, 
combining several deterrence-based measures, may facilitate full compensation. 
 
3. Over the years, the European Commission has been too one-sided in presenting the US class 
action mechanism only from a negative perspective. The experiences in the EU member 
states suggest that antitrust collective actions have a future in countries that disregard some 
of the proposed Commission’s measures and instead allow US-oriented tools.  
 
4. Even being much more forceful than the EU’s actions, US antitrust class actions are unable 
to fully deter infringers and to fully compensate victims. Nevertheless, the American system 
has brought positive effects on the objectives of deterrence and compensation. 
 
5. The new EU Directive on damages actions is designed to preserve strong public 
enforcement, while its provisions for private enforcement are insufficient to ensure the 
effective right to compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law. 
 
6. Public enforcement should be considered as the primary tool of EU antitrust enforcement, 
and private enforcement as the secondary tool, regardless of how forceful the latter is. 
Indeed, both tools need to complement each other to ensure effective enforcement of 
competition law.  
 
7. Private antitrust enforcement can contribute not only to achieving the objective of 
compensation, but also to reducing the shortcomings of public enforcement, especially as 
regards insufficient levels of detection and low fines.  
 
8. Effective private enforcement may jeopardize the leniency system and as a result may 
jeopardize public enforcement.  
 
9. Law schools should encourage a PhD dissertation that consists of published articles in peer-
reviewed legal journals for the award of a doctoral degree.   
 
10. A dissertation can be compared to a forest: the deeper you go, the more trees you see. 
 
